Why the 'Virtual Close' Virtually Died

11.10.2011
In early 2001, Larry Carter, then CFO with Cisco Systems Inc., about the company's success achieving the so-called virtual close. "We can literally close our books within hours, producing consolidated financial statements on the first workday following the end of any monthly, quarterly or annual reporting period. More important, the decision makers who need to achieve sales targets, manage expenses, and make daily tactical operating decisions now have real-time access to detailed operating data."

While it's difficult to find a single, standard definition for "virtual close," it's generally described as an organization's ability to close its books and provide performance results in real-time, or at least near-real-time. Having this information should enable management to make more rapid, yet informed decisions, providing a competitive advantage.

Certainly, the benefits of having real-time access to a company's performance results appear compelling. And to be sure, executives still strive to streamline their processes. Yet the desire over the past decade to close the company's books almost instantaneously, once a reporting period is over, appears to have, well, virtually abated.

One reason: the implosion of Enron in late 2001, followed by the revelation of accounting debacles at WorldCom and Adelphi in 2002. These bankruptcies, all of which involved some sort of financial malfeasance, were catalysts in the creation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.

For companies in the new environment of external and internal scrutiny that resulted, "the focus became 'get the numbers right,'" says Beth Kaplan, director of finance transformation services with Deloitte & Touche LLP. That's not to suggest that supporters of the virtual close advocated speed at the expense of accuracy. However, Corporate America wasn't in a mood for taking chances. "No wanted misstatements or jail time," Kaplan adds.