In late May of 2004, one of my investigations turned up a large cache of stolen sensitive documents hidden on a server in South Korea. In addition to U.S. military information, there were hundreds of pages of detailed schematics and project information marked "Lockheed Martin Proprietary Information ' Export Controlled" that were associated with the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter. Ironically, Sandia Corp., the private company that manages Sandia National Laboratories, is a subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corp. It was this discovery that prompted my meeting with [supervisors] and when I was told that "it was not my concern." Later, I turned it over to the U.S. Army and the FBI and helped investigate how it was taken and where the path led.

Are you at liberty to disclose what sort of back-hacking you did? Not at this point, but I will be able to discuss the activities in more detail at an unclassified level in the future.

What happened to all of the information that you uncovered relating to the Titan Rain operation? Has it been used in any way to deal with the problem of Chinese hackers? All of the information and analyses I conducted and any conclusions I reached were given to the FBI. The information relevant to the U.S. Army was given to them. I cannot answer your last question because it likely encompasses classified information.

You claimed you never were given an opportunity to get the information you uncovered to the proper authorities at the other organizations. Why was that? I attempted several times to find a Sandia channel to get the information to the organizations that were impacted. At the first meeting with my supervisor and the Sandia information security manager, [the supervisor] stated "we don't care about any of this. We only care about Sandia computers."

After I insisted that there must be a way to throw the information "over the fence" to Sandia's counterintelligence organization or other federal and military authorities, he said that I was forbidden from doing this, and that it "wasn't my job." A Sandia counterintelligence manager and my immediate supervisor recanted pages of their previously sworn deposition testimony and conceded that a meeting that they allegedly had with me to provide me with a channel to get the information to the proper authorities never happened.