c) The IED Connection Recently, concerns about RFID usage as a vulnerability at seaports and land ports have surfaced, suggesting that the use of RFID can constitute an Improvised Explosive Device (IED). In fact, it is true that RFID emissions can serve as the trigger-mechanism for detonating an explosive device within the container. Because an explosive device can be easily wired to detonate with the proper RFID frequency signal at any of our nation's seaports and land ports, all out nation's ports that employ the approved RFID frequency for shipping containers become more vulnerable to terrorist attack.

To verify this vulnerability, in November 2007 a Southern city's police department's bomb squad, and three business firms connected to RFID usage demonstrated how RFID can be employed for that purpose. The demonstration was 100% successful, and it showed empirically the vulnerability of RFID transmissions as approved for use with containers passing through our international ports-of-entry. Present at that demonstration were representatives of the Department of Defense. In DOD's own words, the U.S. Army representatives examined the device and wiring and confirm that a commercial RFID interrogator was use to 'wake up' a commercial RFID tag. When the RFID tag responded on the 433 MHz frequency, the relay closed and the blasting cap set off the explosive charge.

Months later DHS responded to the demo: DHS recognizes and benefits from the use of RFID technology to ensure the smooth and secure movement of both people and cargo into the United States. It is accurate that RFID systems are in use at U.S. ports of entry (air, sea and land) and have been adopted by a number of private-sector companies for supply chain management, asset and shipment tracking and inventory purposes. While RFID system used in maritime ports rely upon a variety of transmission frequencies for port and terminals operations, there is currently no one common RFID frequency in use throughout the global supply chain.

While it is technically feasible that the detection of RFID emissions could be used to trigger an explosive device within a container, DHS does not agree with the report's assessment that ports that employ RFID technology become more vulnerable to terrorist attack.

DHS admits in writing that using the FCC-approved frequency for shipping containers as a trigger mechanism for detonating an explosive device is technically feasible (capable of being carried out). In summary, the weaknesses of RFID use in container security are linked to significant problems: 1. The acquisition of or access to real property; 2. The cost of installing fixed antennas and transceivers; 3. The maintenance of these fixed sites; 4. The absence of a common global frequency; 5. The existence of diverse RF protocols; 6. The age of data transmitted ( distance between choke points); and 7. Its use as and IED.