It's an old debate, of course. But it is made new in post-Sarbox terms by Jean C. Bedard and Rani Hoitash of Bentley University's Department of Accountancy and Udi Hoitash of Northeastern University. They looked at 2004-2007 records from 7,034 publicly traded companies, and found that the 549 of them that picked their own CFOs for board seats were less likely to report internal control weaknesses as described under Sarbox Sections 302 and 404.

And in addition to being less likely to file earnings restatements, these companies with the CFO having board representation also exhibited higher accrual-based earnings quality, according to the three professors' .

According to the research, the CFO board member may stand alone among C-suiters in terms of internal directors bringing beneficial results to the company.

"These effects are not due to simply having more executives in the board room, as we find that having more insiders in general on the board is actually negative to financial reporting quality and having the COO on the board does not improve financial reporting quality," the paper states. But the CFO on the board is seen as a special case.